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The dynamics of immunity are crucial to understanding the long-term
patterns of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. Several cases of reinfection with
SARS-CoV-2 have been documented 48–142 days after the initial infection
and immunity to seasonal circulating coronaviruses is estimated to be
shorter than 1 year. Using an age-structured, deterministic model, we
explore potential immunity dynamics using contact data from the UK popu-
lation. In the scenario where immunity to SARS-CoV-2 lasts an average of
three months for non-hospitalized individuals, a year for hospitalized
individuals, and the effective reproduction number after lockdown ends is
1.2 (our worst-case scenario), we find that the secondary peak occurs in
winter 2020 with a daily maximum of 387 000 infectious individuals and
125 000 daily new cases; threefold greater than in a scenario with permanent
immunity. Our models suggest that longitudinal serological surveys to
determine if immunity in the population is waning will be most informative
when sampling takes place from the end of the lockdown in June until
autumn 2020. After this period, the proportion of the population with anti-
bodies to SARS-CoV-2 is expected to increase due to the secondary wave.
Overall, our analysis presents considerations for policy makers on the
longer-term dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 in the UK and suggests that strategies
designed to achieve herd immunity may lead to repeated waves of infection
as immunity to reinfection is not permanent.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Modelling that shaped the early
COVID-19 pandemic response in the UK’.1. Introduction
(a) Public health context
As of the 1st of July 2020, SARS-CoV-2 has infected at least 10 million people
worldwide and resulted in over 500 000 deaths [1,2]. Following the initial out-
break from a live animal market in Wuhan, China [3], the United Kingdom
(UK) has been among the countries most severely affected, reporting over 310
000 cases and 44 000 deaths, which is among the highest per capita rates [2,4].
Since the 23rd of March, nationwide non-pharmaceutical interventions (lock-
down) have been in place to reduce social contacts by closing schools and
shops; encouraging homeworking; and social distancing in public places. Similar
measures have been in place in other European countries since late February 2020,
with restrictions easing in France, Germany and Italy fromMay 2020. Within the






































placing fewer restrictions on social mixing while aiming to
build up immunity in the population [5].
(b) Immune response to SARS-CoV-2
Following infection with the virus, hospitalized patients have
an acute immune response where virus-specific IgM and IgG
antibody titres reach a maximum 15–21 and 22–27 days,
respectively, after symptom onset [6,7]. Antibodies raised in
hospitalized patients and animal models against SARS-CoV-2
provide protection for at least several weeks following infection
[8,9], suggesting that immediate reinfection with the virus is
unlikely. There is limited evidence that hospitalized patients
with more severe symptoms show a greater antibody response
[6,9]. Asymptomatic individuals have aweaker IgG and specific
antibody response to SARS-CoV-2 and are more likely to
become seronegative following convalescence [10]. Antibody
titres raised against related coronaviruses SARS-CoV and
MERS-CoV have been shown to decay over time [11,12]. Fur-
thermore, immunity to seasonal circulating coronaviruses has
been estimated to last for less than 1 year [13] and recovered
individuals from coronavirus NL63 can become reinfected
[14]. Concerns that immunity to SARS-CoV-2 may also
wane therefore motivated the present study [15].
(c) Epidemiological modelling
Dynamic epidemiological models play a major role in shaping
the timing and intensity of interventions against SARS-CoV-2 in
the UK and elsewhere [16]. Many models or simulations have
assumed that infected individuals recover with permanent
immunity [16–18]. In suchmodels, the epidemic reaches extinc-
tion after running out of infected individuals, although they do
not preclude a secondwave of infections after lockdown [19]. If
immunitywanes over a period of time, or recovered individuals
have only partial immunity to reinfection, this substantially
alters the dynamics of the system [20]. In the absence of stochas-
tic extinction and demography (births and deaths) in a
population with equal mixing where R0 is the basic reproduc-
tion number, γ is the average duration of infection and ω is
the reciprocal of the average duration of immunity, the endemic
equilibriumproportion of infected in the population, I*, is given
by (R0− 1)ω/γR0 and thus, in the absence of interventions, the
infection persists indefinitely when R0 > 1 [21].
In dynamic models that make the assumption of
homogeneous mixing, the ‘classic’ threshold at which the pro-
portion of the population with immunity prevents invasion by
a pathogen is given by 1− 1/R0 [21]. As R0 for SARS-CoV-2 is
generally estimated between 2.4 and 5.6 [22–24], this equates
to 58–82% of the population requiring immunity to eventually
halt the epidemic. Serological studies conducted in affected
countries to-datehave reported theproportionof the population
with antibodies against SARS-CoV-2 to bemuch lower than this
figure [22,25]. However, whenmore realistic non-homogeneous
mixing is considered, the observed immunity threshold is lower
than the classical threshold [26]. Recent studies have considered
this question for SARS-CoV-2 [27,28], with Britton et al. [28]
noting that the disease-inducedpopulation immunity threshold
could be closer to 40% in an age-structured populationwhenR0
is 2.5, rather than the 60% ‘classic’ population immunity
threshold. This phenomenon is driven by individuals who
havemore contacts, or greater susceptibility to the virus, getting
infected earlier on and leaving the susceptible population, thus
decelerating the growth of the epidemic.(d) Models with waning immunity
Kissler et al. [29] considered the dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 in the
USAwith seasonal forcing, homogeneous mixing and waning
immunity that could be boosted by exposure to seasonal circu-
lating betacoronaviruses. Under these assumptions, the
incidence of SARS-CoV-2 was predicted to rebound in winter
months. Here we do not consider seasonality, but rather the
dynamics of transmission in an age-structured population
with different periods of waning immunity in the context of
the UK emerging from lockdown.
We developed a discrete-time gamma delay-distributed
(susceptible–exposed–infectious–recovered–susceptible; SEIRS)
model, which incorporates current knowledge about the natural
history of the virus and the UK population. Ourmodel accounts
for symptomatic and asymptomatic transmission, and hetero-
geneity in both daily contacts and infection susceptibility
by age group. We consider different durations of immunity for
hospitalized patients (or those with more severe symptoms)
compared to non-hospitalized patients (those with less
severe symptoms). We use this model to explore a range of
scenarios in the UK population in the context of stringent non--
pharmaceutical interventions (lockdown) followed by more
limited interventions over a 2-year period from March
2020, and the impact of immunity duration on the longer-term
disease equilibrium.
(e) Reinfection with SARS-CoV-2
After this analysis was presented to policymakers (see
electronic supplementary material, Accompanying Letter),
the first case of reinfection with SARS-CoV-2 was reported
in a 33-year-old male in Hong Kong in August 2020, 142
days after his initial diagnosis [30]. Following the first infec-
tion in March, the patient was discharged from hospital
after two negative PCR results. Genomic sequencing con-
firmed that the viruses in March and August were from
distinct clades. Reinfections have since been reported in
single cases in the USA [31], Ecuador [32] and Belgium [33]
at 48, 63 and 93 days, respectively, from the first reported
infections. Two asymptomatic reinfections were also reported
in Indian healthcare workers 108 and 111 days from the
initial infection [34]. The case of reinfection in the USA, in a
25-year-old male from Nevada, was notable for the second
infection causing more severe symptoms than the first, and
led to the patient requiring supplemental oxygen and hospi-
talization. While these reported cases confirm the biological
plausibility of reinfection with SARS-CoV-2, the data are
too sparse to infer an expected duration of immunity at the
population level.2. Methods
(a) Model structure
We use current knowledge of the natural history of the virus to
construct a plausible epidemiological model (figure 1). We
extend a previously published deterministic compartmental
model that has provided general insights into the dynamics of
the epidemic at a regional level for a range of scenarios [18].
The general framework of the model is given in figure 1 and par-
ameter values are shown in table 1. The disease states for each
age group are susceptible (S), exposed (E), symptomatic infec-
tious (IS), asymptomatic infectious (IA), hospitalized recovered


















Figure 1. Flow diagram showing the SARS-CoV-2 transmission model out-
line. Within age class i, the disease states are susceptible (S), exposed (E),
symptomatic infectious (IS), asymptomatic infectious (IA), hospitalized recov-
ered (RH) and non-hospitalized recovered (RN). The rate parameters λ
represent the force of infection acting on an individual in age class i
(equation (2.8)), σ represents the mean latency period, γ the mean infec-
tious period, ωN the mean duration of immunity for non-hospitalized
recovered individuals, and ωH the mean duration of immunity for hospital-
ized recovered individuals. The probabilities ϕi give the proportion of
individuals in age group i who are asymptomatic following infection and
pi the proportion in age group i who require hospitalization (or have
severe symptoms) following infection. All model parameters are given in






































number of individuals in the compartment at a given time t, with
the sum over all the states at time t equal to the size of the UK
population in 2018 (66.4 million).
(i) Distributed natural history of infection
The mean latent and infectious periods for SARS-CoV-2 have
been estimated as 4.5 days and 3.1 days, respectively, using
viral load data and the timing of known index and secondary
case contacts (figure 2) [35]. The probability masses of the
latent and infectious period distributions are centred around
the mean, therefore we consider that gamma distributions with
an integer shape parameter, also known as Erlang distributions,
give more realistic waiting times than exponential distributions,
which have a mode of zero [46–48]. We decided to use a discrete
time implementation (difference equations), as this permits
greater flexibility in implementing interventions compared to
differential equations. Using difference equations results in a dis-
cretized approximation of the Erlang distribution compared with
continuous time models, with the output converging as the time
step approaches zero [49,50]. We used a time step of 0.01 days to
ensure that the infection dynamics closely approximate a
continuous time model.
(ii) Transmissibility and infectivity
Estimates of the transmissibility of the virus in the UK at the
beginning of the epidemic have ranged from 2.4 to 5.6
[23,51,52]; therefore, we assume that R0 at the beginning of the
epidemic in the UK population is 4.0 [23]. Non-pharmaceutical
interventions have been shown to bring the effective reproduc-
tion number (Rt) below one, and in some settings have led to
local elimination of the virus [22,23].
Testing performed in closed populations suggests that 40–
50% of SARS-CoV-2 infections may be asymptomatic [41,53,54],
while data from contact tracing show transmission can occur
from asymptomatic individuals [55]. We make the assumption
that asymptomatic individuals (IA) have half the infectiousness
of symptomatic individuals (IS) [6,16].
The UK population shows variable contact rates by age
[43,44] and, while studies show mixed results, evidence is accru-
ing that children have a lower susceptibility to acquiring theinfection than adults [40,56,57]. We assume that children (aged
15 years or younger) have 40% the susceptibility of adults [45].(iii) Immunity following infection
We allow the duration of immunity to differ for recovered indi-
viduals with severe symptoms who are hospitalized (RH)
versus those with less severe symptoms who are not hospitalized
(RN), as there is evidence from SARS-CoV-2 and other corona-
viruses that individuals with milder symptoms may have a
lower antibody response [38]. Among the reported cases of
reinfections, all individuals showed at most ‘mild’ symptoms
during the first infection [58], supporting the notion that
infections that cause more severe symptoms could generate
longer-lasting immunity.
Epidemic transitions for age group i at time t + 1 are given by:
Stþ1 ¼ St(1 ltþ1)þ ft(RN ; o, vN)þ ft(RH ; o, vH) (2:1)
Etþ1 ¼ Et þ Stltþ1  ft(E; m, s) (2:2)
IAtþ1 ¼ IAt þ fift(E; m, s) ft(IA; n, g) (2:3)
IStþ1 ¼ ISt þ (1 fi)ft(E; m, s) ft(IS; n, g) (2:4)





 ft(RN ; o, vN) (2:5)
and RHtþ1 ¼ RHt þ
pi
1 fi
ft(IS; n, g) ft(RH ; o, vH) (2:6)
The function notation ft(X; k, μ) represents the output of the
discretized Erlang delay distribution from states E, IS, IA, RH
and RN. Our model code contains k sub-compartments for each
Erlang distributed disease state, with a rate k/μ between sub-
compartments, and an overall waiting time of μ. The function
notation is used in equations (2.1)–(2.6) for shorthand conven-
ience instead of writing out k difference equations for each
disease state. While we do not calculate probability distributions
within the model, as a simplified example: if n individuals enter
state X at a single time point t, by time t + τ there will be remain-
ing n(1− g(τ, k, μ)), where g(τ, k, μ) gives the cumulative Erlang
distribution with shape parameter k and mean duration μ [49].
The next generation matrix (K = kij) gives the expected
number of secondary infections in age group i resulting from
contact with an index case in age group j:
kij ¼ b
g
hici,j(f jyþ (1 f j)), (2:7)
where ηi is the relative susceptibility of age group i; υ the relative
infectiousness of asymptomatic cases; and ci,j is the average
number of daily contacts between a single individual in age
group j and all individuals in age group i [44] (table 1). The
basic reproduction number (R0) is given by the spectral radius
ρ(K ), which is the largest absolute eigenvalue of K. As we specify
the value of R0, the transmission parameter β is left as a free par-
ameter that is scaled to the correct value. The force of infection














ci,j(ISj,t þ IAj,ty), (2:8)
where M is the number of discrete age groups (M = 15) and Ni
gives the population size of age group i.(b) Immunological scenarios
Using data and timing of events from the UK epidemic, we
explore four scenarios with varying average durations of immu-
nity to SARS-CoV-2 (figure 2).
Table 1. Summary of parameter values used in the modelled scenarios of SARS-CoV-2 transmission in the UK.
parameter name symbol estimate(s) details reference(s)
basic reproduction number R0 4.0 — [23]
latency period mean σ 4.5 days — [35–37]
latency period shape m 4 — [35–37]
infectious period mean γ 3.1 days — [35–37]
infectious period shape n 2 — [35–37]
immune duration mean non-hospitalized ωN ∞, 365, 180, 90 days varies by scenario [11,38,39]
immune duration mean hospitalized ωH ∞, 365 days varies by scenario [11,38,39]
immune duration shape o 2 centres distribution around mean [11]
P(asymptomatic|infection) ϕi ≤15 yrs 0.75 varies by age group i [40]
. 15 yrs 0.5
P(hospitalization|infection) pi 0–0.26 varies by age group i [16,41]
effective reproduction number Rt 1.2, 0.8 during lockdown [23,42]
0.9, 1, 1.1, 1.2 after lockdown ends key assumption
contact matrix C or cij varies by age group BBC survey [43,44]
relative infectiousness of asymptomatic cases υ 0.5 — [16]
relative age susceptibility ηi ≤15 yrs 0.4 — [45]
>15 yrs 1
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Figure 2. Probabilities for time spent in each state given Erlang (gamma) distributed waiting times. (a) Proportion of individuals in exposed and infectious classes
since time from infection. Time exposed and time infectious have mean durations of 4.5 and 3.1 days, respectively. (b) Proportion of individuals immune since






































S1. Permanent: Where immunity is lifelong for both hospitalized
(RH) and non-hospitalized (RN) cases.
S2. Waning (12 months): Where immunity is lifelong for hospi-
talized cases and has an average duration of 365 days for
non-hospitalized cases.
S3. Waning (6 months): Where immunity is lifelong for hospital-
ized cases and has an average duration of 180 days for
non-hospitalized cases.
S4. Short-lived: Where immunity lasts, on average, 365 days for
hospitalized cases and 90 days for non-hospitalized cases.
(i) UK-specific parameterization
All scenarios are initialized with 2968 infected individuals in
early March 2020 [59], which is when the majority of importation
events into the UK are likely to have occurred [59]. Intervention
measures are initiated on the 23rd of March (date the UKnationwide lockdown started), with an immediate reduction in
the effective reproduction number (expected number of second-
ary cases from an index case at time t; Rt) to 1.2 for a three
week period, followed by a further reduction in Rt to 0.8 until
lockdown measures are eased on 15th June [42]. After this
time, Rt is brought to 0.9, 1, 1.1 or 1.2 until March 2022. We con-
sidered the majority of our analysis over a (relatively short)
2-year period to explore the epidemic up to a secondary peak;
beyond this point the dynamics are likely to be altered depend-
ing on further interventions or changes to Rt. As we simulate
disease dynamics over a relatively short period of time, we do
not consider demography (births and deaths) or transitions
between age classes (ageing). To obtain equilibrium values, we
simulated epidemic trajectories for up to 5 years.
The UK contact matrix (average daily contacts between a
single individual in age group j with individuals in age group
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Figure 3. Next generation matrix (K = kij) showing the number of secondary cases generated by an index case from age group j (rows) in age group i (columns).
The matrices are shown for different time points: at baseline before the implementation of interventions; during the lockdown period; and in the post-lockdown
period when the effective reproduction number (Rt) rises to 0.9–1.2. The average number of secondary cases generated by an index case from age group j is the






































individuals in the UK population provided detailed information
on their daily contacts in the home, in the workplace, at school
and in other settings [43,44]. The contact matrix is altered to
account for changes to contact patterns during and after the
main intervention period [37]. During the lockdown, home,
work, school, and other contacts are reduced to 0.8, 0.3, 0.1
and 0.2, respectively, of their baseline values. This reflects the
school closures for all children, except for those of key workers,
and that workers were encouraged to work from home.
Reduction in home contacts accounts for the absence of visitors
to the home during the lockdown. In the post-lockdown phase,
home, work, school, and other contacts are scaled to 1, 0.8,
0.85 and 0.75, respectively, of their baseline values to reflect lim-
ited social distancing measures that are likely to be in place until
at least the end of 2021.
Analysis was performed in R v.4.0.2. We present figures from
model output in the text to the nearest thousand. Code to repro-
duce the analysis with user-specified parameters is available at
https://github.com/tc13/covid-19-immunity.
3. Results
(a) Heterogeneity in transmission
The epidemic is driven by the rate of infectious contacts
between individuals in different age groups. This is described
by the next generation matrix in which the average number of
secondary cases generated by an index case in age group j isthe summation of row j (equation (2.8) and figure 3). At the
beginning of the epidemic, when SARS-CoV-2 is spreading
rapidly, all age groups are involved in transmission; in par-
ticular those aged 20–39 years. An index case in the 20–24
age group, for instance, is expected to generate an average
of 4.3 secondary cases at baseline. As lockdown measures
come into force this dramatically reduces the expected
number of secondary cases due to fewer contacts and a
lower probability of infection given contact. The average
number of secondary cases from an individual aged 20–24
during lockdown drops to 0.9 and the transmission parameter
β, which captures the probability of infection given contact, is
decreased from 0.18 at baseline to 0.11. In the post-lockdown
period, daily contacts are increased to a higher proportion of
their baseline values (see §2); in order to keep the reproduction
number equal to the dominant eigenvalue of the next gener-
ation matrix, β is consequently reduced to 0.05 when Rt =0.9
and to 0.07 when Rt =1.2. This implies that, to maintain Rt
below one when more contacts are occurring in the population
post-lockdown, the probability that contact results in infection
will need to be reduced.(b) Infection dynamics
For the first 100 days until the end of the lockdown, the infec-






































scenarios S1–S4 (figure 4a,c,e,g). After this time the dynamics
depend on both the rate at which recovered individuals lose
immunity and become susceptible again, and the post-lock-
down Rt.
Given our model and parameters, on the first day the
intervention is imposed (23rd March 2020) there are 108 000
new SARS-CoV-2 cases, which is within the 95% credible
interval (CrI) of new cases estimated for the UK on that
day (95% CrI 54 000–155 000 [60]), and 75 000 people are
infectious (infected compartments IA + IS) on this date.
From the 3rd of March until the 23rd of March, there are
559 000 cumulative cases across all age groups and 524 000
in adults aged 19 years or over, which is within the credible
interval for an estimate of cumulative cases in this period
(95% CrI 266 000–628 000 [60]). When most of the lockdown
measures were eased in June, 5.7% of the total population
and 6.8% of adults aged 19 years or over have immunity to
SARS-CoV-2 (in recovered classes RH and RN), which is
comparable to estimates of antibody levels in the UK popu-
lation, estimated as 6.8% of blood donors on 24th May 2020
(95% confidence interval 5.2–8.6%; individuals 18 years or
over [25]).00274(c) Secondary peak in infections
A secondary peak in infections is expected in spring 2021
where Rt = 1.1 or winter 2020 where Rt = 1.2 (figure 4e,g).
The height of the secondary peak is determined by the rate
at which immunity is lost. In our worst-case scenario (S4:
short-lived immunity) where immunity lasts an average of
three months for non-hospitalized patients, a year for hospi-
talized patients and Rt following lockdown is 1.2, then the
secondary peak will exceed the initial peak with a maximum
of 387 000 infectious individuals and 125 000 daily new cases
in December 2020. This is threefold greater than the number
of new cases in scenario S1 where immunity is permanent;
the maximum number of infectious individuals in the sec-
ondary peak is 126 000 and there are 41 000 daily new cases
(figure 4g). We note that the timing of the secondary peak
in infection curves across immunological scenarios is closely
synchronized and in winter 2020–2021. This synchrony and
timing are also observed during the epidemic when values
of Rt post-lockdown are greater than 1.2 (explored for
values of Rt from 1.3 to 2.0).
When Rt following lockdown is 1.1 the differences
between the immunity scenarios are even more pronounced,
with a 10-fold difference in the height of the secondary peak
between a scenario of permanent immunity and one of short-
lived immunity. However, the secondary peak does not
exceed the height (maximum number of infectious
individuals) of the initial wave in any scenario. When immu-
nity wanes rapidly, the second peak is observed in April
2021 with a maximum of 154 000 infectious individuals
and 50 000 daily new cases. By contrast, when immunity is
permanent, the number of new infections decays slowly
rather than accelerates and there are projected to be a maxi-
mum of only 15 000 infectious individuals and 5000 daily
new cases in April 2021 (figure 4e).(d) Population immunity
The dynamics of population immunity (recovered compart-
ments RH +RN) are similarly shaped by the expectedduration of immunity against SARS-CoV-2 and the post-lock-
down Rt.
Immunity decays from midway through the lockdown
period in scenarios S2–S4 of waning (12 or 6 months) and
short-lived immunity and resurges following a secondary
wave of infection if Rt > 1 (figure 4f,h). After lockdown, a
fall in the proportion of the population immune to the
virus is observed until autumn 2020 for all values of Rt,
after which point the secondary wave, if Rt > 1, causes the
proportion of the population immune to rise again. This
suggests that longitudinal serological surveys to detect
waning immunity would be most informative when con-
ducted in the period June–October 2020.
(e) Consequences of age structure
The large differences in the heights of the secondary
peaks when Rt > 1 between immunological scenarios
(figure 4a,c,e,g) can be explained by the heterogeneity in
transmission (see the next generation matrix in figure 3).
Infectious and immune cases as a proportion of the total
age group are shown in figure 5 for scenarios S1 & S4 of per-
manent and short-lived immunity where Rt = 1.2 following
lockdown. A higher proportion of individuals aged between
20 and 39 are infected early in the epidemic, and this leads to
12.4–13.9% of individuals in these age groups having anti-
bodies by October 2020 when immunity is life-long
(figure 5b). When immunity wanes, however, by October
2020 this drops to 6.7–7.8% (figure 5d ), thus replenishing
the pool of susceptible individuals with the age groups that
disproportionately drive transmission. This causes the sec-
ondary peak of infectious cases to rise more rapidly and to
a greater height when immunity wanes rapidly (figure 5c),
compared with permanent immunity (figure 5a). Our
models suggest that the age distribution of cases in the epi-
demic will not change greatly over time; as seen in figure 5,
the ordering of the proportion of each age group infected
remains constant in both scenarios of permanent and short-
lived immunity.
( f ) Longer-term dynamics: extinction or endemic
equilibrium
We explored the impact of waning immunity and Rt on the
equilibrium values for the different simulations over a
longer, 5-year period until March 2025 (table 2). If the post-
lockdown Rt is suppressed below one following lockdown,
then the differences in immunity will have less impact on
the longer-term infection dynamics, assuming no imported
cases, as transmission of SARS-CoV-2 becomes unsustaina-
ble and the virus reaches extinction between April and
November 2021 depending on the immunity scenario. In
simulations where Rt equals one, if immunity is permanent
then the epidemic becomes extinct in May 2022. When immu-
nity wanes there is no secondary peak (figure 4c), however,
the infections persist at a low level of endemicity equivalent
to 107, 236 and 1,122 daily cases in immunity scenarios S2–
S4, respectively. For larger values of Rt, and where immunity
wanes, the system oscillates with subsequent peaks of infec-
tion over the next 5 years until a steady state is reached. We
find that, if Rt = 1.2 post-lockdown and immunity is short-
lived, there is the potential for over 73 000 new cases daily,
5000 hospitalizations and 913 intensive care unit (ICU)
post-lockdown Rt = 0.9
immunity scenario
S1: permanent
S2: waning (12 months)
S3: waning (6 months)
S4: short-lived
post-lockdown Rt = 0.9
immunity scenario
S1: permanent
S2: waning (12 months)
S3: waning (6 months)
S4: short-lived
post-lockdown Rt = 1.0 post-lockdown Rt = 1.0
post-lockdown Rt = 1.1 post-lockdown Rt = 1.1
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Figure 4. Projections from immunity scenarios S1–4 with post-lockdown Rt ranging from 0.9 to 1.2. (a,c,e,g) The number of infected with SARS-CoV-2 in the UK
population over time, both asymptomatic and symptomatic (IA + IS). (b,d,f,h) The proportion of the UK population with immunity (compartments RH + RN). Dashed
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Figure 5. Projections from immunity scenarios S1 & S4 with post-lockdown Rt of SARS-CoV-2 at 1.2 in the UK population over time. Left panels (a,c) show the
proportion of each age group infected, for both asymptomatic and symptomatic (IA + IS) individuals. Right panels (b,d) show the proportion of the each age group







































admissions (calculated as 17% of all hospitalized cases [61]) at
endemic equilibrium (January 2025), which would be suffi-
cient to overwhelm contact tracing services and ICU
capacity [62,63].
4. Discussion
Despite only 6.8% of the adult UK population having
immunity against SARS-CoV-2 in our simulation at the
end of the lockdown, the modelled scenarios suggest that,
if this acquired immunity wanes over time, there are sub-
stantive differences to the subsequent infection dynamics.
Waning immunity impacts on the height of the secon-
dary peak and, in the absence of future interventions,
establishes the virus at levels of endemic equilibrium
that could overwhelm contact tracing services and ICU
capacity [62,63].
We predict that surveys to detect waning immunity at the
population level would be most effective when carried out in
the period between the end of lockdown and autumn 2020, as
after this point an upsurge in cases is expected that will
increase the proportion of the population with immunity to
SARS-CoV-2. In particular, this will allow evaluation of
whether specific antibodies generated against the virus are
short-lived if reductions in antibody prevalence are observed
at the population level.
We find that transmission is driven disproportionately by
individuals of working age, and subsequently a higherproportion of individuals aged 20–39 years become infected
early in the pandemic and subsequently develop immunity
(figures 3 and 5). This prediction is borne out by serological
data from Switzerland, which showed that individuals aged
20–49 years were significantly more likely to be seropositive
in May 2020 compared with younger and older age groups
[64]. We postulate that ‘key workers’ in the UK population
who have continued to work during the lockdown are
more likely to have antibodies against SARS-CoV-2. Higher
immunity among individuals of working age has the effect
of slowing the subsequent epidemic when immunity is per-
manent. Conversely, when immunity wanes, previously
infected individuals of working age rejoin the susceptible
pool and so contribute again to transmission, leading to a
high growth rate and a larger secondary peak of infected
cases. In these circumstances, efforts to suppress transmission
will be challenging in the absence of a transmission-blocking
vaccine [15]. We note that the model structure developed here
is capable of simulating the impact of vaccination with a
vaccine that provides temporary transmission-blocking
immunity, and could be used to predict the optimal timing
for booster shots.
The projected trajectory of the epidemic after lockdown is
highly sensitive to the effective reproduction number, with
model behaviour for values of Rt slightly above or below
one displaying qualitatively different dynamics (figure 4).
Although we do not describe model output for higher
values of Rt, the dynamics over a wider range of effective
Table 2. Values at equilibrium from the modelled scenarios for SARS-CoV-2 in the UK, explored over a 5-year horizon (March 2020 to March 2025). 1Effective
reproduction number of SARS-CoV-2 after lockdown. 2Assumed duration of immunity for hospitalized and non-hospitalized individuals, see §2 for details of
immunity scenarios S1–S4. 3Number of individuals newly infected with SARS-CoV-2 who enter the exposed E state. 4Number of symptomatic individuals with
SARS-CoV-2 who enter the recovered hospitalized (RH) state. 5Number of hospitalized individuals admitted to intensive care units (ICU), under the assumption
that 17% of hospitalized cases in the UK require care in high dependency units [61]. 6Either when the number of daily new cases drops below one (extinction),
or when the daily new cases are the same integer value over a sustained period (endemic equilibrium). If models take longer than 5 years to reach a steady
state, the values on the 1st of March 2025 are reported.
Rt 1 immunity scenario
2 daily cases3 daily hospitalizations4 daily ICU admissions5 date equilibrium reached6
0.9 S1: Permanent 0 0 0 April 2021
S2: Waning (12
months)
0 0 0 June 2020
S3: Waning (6 months) 0 0 0 September 2021
S4: Short-lived 0 0 0 November 2021
1.0 S1: Permanent 0 0 0 April 2022
S2: Waning (12
months)
71 5 1 October 2022
S3: Waning (6 months) 217 16 3 After 1 March 2025
S4: Short-lived 1160 84 14 After 1 March 2025
1.1 S1: Permanent 0 0 0 June 2024
S2: Waning (12
months)
9117 654 111 After 1 March 2025
S3: Waning (6 months) 14867 1,047 178 After 1 March 2025
S4: Short-lived 39945 2,887 491 May 2023
1.2 S1: Permanent 0 0 0 November 2022
S2: Waning (12
months)
19826 1,443 245 After 1 March 2025
S3: Waning (6 months) 27488 1,898 323 After 1 March 2025






































reproduction numbers post-lockdown (1.3–2.0) are qualitat-
ively the same as when Rt =1.2. This shows the importance
of timely and accurate estimates of Rt to inform control strat-
egies, and ensuring widespread community testing and
contact tracing is in place. Our calculations show that to sup-
press Rt below one when contact rates rise to a higher fraction
of baseline (pre-lockdown) values, the probability of infection
given contact (represented by the β parameter) must drop by
around half. Interventions that have the potential to reduce
the probability of infection include social distancing, regular
hand washing and the wearing of face masks outside the
home [65].
Our study reinforces the importance of better understand-
ing SARS-CoV-2 immunity among recovered individuals of
different ages and disease severity. In scenarios where immu-
nity wanes and Rt following lockdown is greater than one,
the SARS-CoV-2 epidemic never reaches extinction due to
herd immunity, but rather the number of infected cases oscil-
lates with subsequent waves of infection before reaching
endemic equilibrium (table 2). Even in simulations where
the post-lockdown reproduction number only narrowly
exceeds one (Rt =1.1), if immunity wanes over an average of
1 year for severe cases and three months for non-severe
cases, this is projected to lead to an equilibrium state of
nearly 40 000 daily new cases and 500 daily admissions tointensive care. Policy strategies aiming to achieve herd immu-
nity are therefore risky [5]. As individuals can lose their
immunity and become reinfected with SARS-CoV-2, a
stable population immunity threshold can never be reached
in the absence of a vaccine with lifelong efficacy [21]. The
establishment of an endemic equilibrium state is dependent
on no future interventions or changes to Rt, which we con-
sider unlikely as policy makers and public health agencies
are likely to react to future outbreaks with localized control
measures.
One of the strengths of our study is that the model is cali-
brated to key features of the UK epidemic. While we did not
explicitly fit to data, new cases at the start of the lockdown,
cumulative cases in March and the proportion of the adult
population with antibodies to SARS-CoV-2 are highly com-
parable between our output and current estimates [25,60].
We used contact matrices from a comprehensive study of con-
tact patterns in the UK population [43], in addition to
demographic data from the Office for National Statistics, to
give our simulations the best chance of capturing realistic
age-specific transmission patterns in the UK population.
Plausible estimates on which to base expectations for the
duration of immunity are sparse in the current literature.
Rosado et al. [39] estimated that antibodies could wane in






































to the estimated duration of immunity against seasonal circu-
lating coronaviruses [13,29]. Even with this consideration,
there are many probability distributions that can be used to
capture a median duration of immunity, and our selection
of an Erlang distribution with a shape parameter of two is
somewhat arbitrary. Our assumptions on the duration of
the latent and infectious periods are more closely informed
by estimates from data [35–37]. We made the decision to cap-
ture the expected duration of these states as a discretized
Erlang distribution rather than the more conventional expo-
nential distribution. This has the benefit of closely
replicating fitted gamma or log-normal distributions within
a compartmental model [46], and has important implications
for the dynamics of the epidemic [66,67]. We make a number
of assumptions regarding the natural history of the virus,
such as the relative susceptibility of children compared with
adults and the relative infectiousness of symptomatic versus
asymptomatic cases based on the current literature [40,45].
Future empirical studies are likely to add to and further
refine these epidemiological parameters. After we completed
the analysis, a study of 37 asymptomatic individuals in China
found that they had a longer period of viral shedding when
compared with symptomatic individuals [10]. While viral
shedding is not necessarily indicative of transmission poten-
tial [7], if these findings are replicated in larger studies, this
may suggest a need to use different durations of infectious-
ness for asymptomatic and symptomatic infections in
subsequent models.
We have aimed to capture future infection dynamics at a
national level in the UK under a range of scenarios. Our
analysis is limited by not considering regional differences in
transmission rates, for instance through a patch (metapopula-
tion) model [44], or a stochastic approach that allows for local
extinction events [21]. There are no deaths in our model,
either from demography or infection. Accounting for mor-
tality would mainly affect dynamics in the oldest age group
(over 70 years) [16,61], and the higher probability of dis-
ease-induced mortality would reduce the build up of
immunity in this age group (figure 5d ). We also do not expli-
citly consider transmission in settings such as schools,
hospitals or care homes, although such dynamics may be
captured indirectly through the contact matrix. Given the
simplicity of the model structure, we advise against treating
the output as an exact prediction of the future. In addition
to the limitations listed above, the epidemic trajectory will
be substantially altered by any future interventions such as
a return to full lockdown conditions, or intensive contact tra-
cing and isolation [29,68]. We emphasize that the average
duration of immunity following recovery impacts substan-
tially on epidemic growth following the easing of non-
pharmaceutical interventions, and that slight differences in
Rt above or below one can lead to qualitatively different
infection dynamics.5. In context
This study was commissioned by the Scientic Pandemic Influ-
enza Group on Modelling (SPI-M), which advises the UK
Department of Health and the Scientific Advisory Group
for Emergencies (SAGE), with the authors drawn together
under the Rapid Assistance in Modelling the Pandemic
(RAMP) initiative by The Royal Society.Concerns were raised by Profs Wendy Barclay & Paul
Kellam of Imperial College London in March 2020 that,
based on parallels with other coronaviruses, immunity gener-
ated against SARS-CoV-2 may not be permanent and
subsequent reinfection may be possible. This was considered
especially likely for individuals that had mild or asympto-
matic infections, as these individuals may generate lower
titres of specific antibodies against the virus (see [15]).
Our analysis began in April 2020 with the aim of produ-
cing an age-structured model for the UK population, which
incorporated waning immunity. Aspects of the model struc-
ture and code were adapted from an earlier publication by
Prem et al. [18].
The study findings were presented in a SPI-M meeting on
the 15th July 2020 in a special session on waning immunity.
Our manuscript was published as a pre-print on medRxiv
and sent for peer review at Philosophical Transactions B
shortly afterwards. At this time, seroprevalence surveys of
UK blood donors had begun to report a declining proportion
of individuals with antibodies against SARS-CoV-2 in London,
however, there had been no confirmed cases of reinfection.
The first confirmed case of reinfection with SARS-CoV-2 was
reported from a 33-year-old male in Hong Kong in August
2020. Reinfections were subsequently reported in Belgium,
Ecuador, India and the USA. The case of reinfection in the
USA was notable for the second infection causing more
severe symptoms than the first and requiring supplemental
oxygen and hospitalization.
When revising our manuscript in light of the comments
by peer reviewers in October 2020, we kept the analysis as
it was presented to SPI-M, with the references reecting the
evidence available at the time of analysis (April–July).
We made the decision to add an additional paragraph
to the Introduction to briefly discuss the documented cases
of reinfections, as this impacts on the biological plausibility
of the model. We now know that reinfection with SARS-
CoV-2 is possible, however population level parameters
such as the expected duration of immunity following recov-
ery from asymptomatic, mild or severe infections are
still unknown.Data accessibility. All data and code for reproducing the analysis are pro-
vided in the following github repository: https://github.com/tc13/
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